State of Utah v. Douglas Stewart Carter: Appellant\u27s Second Supplemental Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1986
State of Utah v. Douglas Stewart Carter: Appellant's
Second Supplemental Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney General State of Utah; Sandra L. Sjogren; Assistant Attorney General;
Attorneys for Respondent; Lionel H. Frankel, Kevin J. Kurumada; Amicus Curiae.
Thomas H. Means; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State of Utah v. Douglas Stewart Carter, No. 860063.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/777
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ 
Respondent, 
V 
DOUGLAS STEWART CARTER 
Defendant/ 
Appellant. ] 
) Fourth Judicial District INE 9707 
Supreme Court No. 8 60 06 3 
) Argument Priority Catego^mM 
APPELLANT'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 
Appeal from a final judgment of Murder in the FirstllHIffiJIiree 
and a Sentence of Death 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
Utah County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Cullen Y. Christensenf District JlilHI! 
THOMAS H. MEANS #2£|ffl|||| 
81 East Center 
P.O. Box 2283 
Provof Utah, 846031 
Attorney for AppelllilUHII 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General, State of Utah 
SANDRA L. SJOGREN 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake Cityf Utah, 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
LIONEL H. FRANKEL 
KEVIN J. KURUMADA 
Counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union 
3 981 Mount Olympus Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84124 
Amicus Curiae 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ 
Respondent, 
V 
DOUGLAS STEWART CARTER 
Defendant/ 
Appellant. ] 
) Fourth Judicial District No. 9707 
Supreme Court No. 8 60 06 3 
) Argument Priority Category No. 1 
APPELLANT'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 
Appeal from a final judgment of Murder in the First Degree 
and a Sentence of Death 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
Utah County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Cullen Y. Christensenf District Judge 
THOMAS H. MEANS #2222 
81 East Center 
P.O. Box 2283 
Provo, Utah, 84603 
Attorney for Appellant 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General, State of Utah 
SANDRA L. SJOGREN 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
LIONEL H. FRANKEL 
KEVIN J. KURUMADA 
Counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union 
3981 Mount Olympus Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84124 
Amicus Curiae 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT 1 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED IN THIS BRIEF 2 
FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 7 
ARGUMENT: 
I. NUMEROUS CASES FROM THIS COURT PROVIDE THAT THE ENTIRE 
RECORD OF CAPITAL CASES SHOULD BE REVIEWED AND ALL ERRORS 
CONSIDERED - SUA SPONTE IF NECESSARY - IF IT APPEARS THAT THE 
INTERESTS OF JUSTICE REQUIRE 10 
II. IN THE STATE'S CITING TWO STATUTES IN THE INFORMATION 
AND THE COURT'S READING THE INFORMATION TO THE JURY, DEFENDANT 
WAS PREJUDICED IN THAT THE JURY WAS LEAD TO BELIEVE THAT 
DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED WITH TWO SEPARATE OFFENSES 12 
III. DEFENDANT IS PREVENTED FROM FULLY PRESENTING ARGUMENTS 
ON APPEAL FOR THE REASON THAT NO RECORD WAS MADE OF THE PARTIES' 
EXERCISE OF THEIR PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 14 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING A PURPORTED 
STATEMENT FROM DEFENDANT AND THIS COURT SHOULD RULE THAT IN 
CAPITAL CASES AND MATTERS OF SIMILAR MAGNITUDE, TO BE ADMISSABLE, 
ALLEGED CONFESSIONS SHOULD BE VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTIONS OF THE 
DECLARANT'S OWN WORDS, MEMORIALIZED BY A STENOGRAPHICALLY OR 
ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED RECORD OF THE DECLARANT'S SPOKEN 
STATEMENT OR BY AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF EQUAL RELIABILITY 15 
V. IMPROPER STATEMENTS MADE BY THE PROSECUTION IN CLOSING 
ARGUMENT UNDULY PREJUDICED DEFENDANT AND RAISE REASONABLE DOUBT 
AS TO WHETHER THE JURY CONFINED ITS DELIBERATION TO LEGALLY 
ADMITTED EVIDENCE 20 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE STATE'S CHIEF 
INVESTIGATIVE OFFICER TO REMAIN AT COUNSEL TABLE THROUGHOUT THE 
TRIAL AND TO TESTIFY FOR THE PROSECUTION 2 8 
VII. DEFENDANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
FOR REASONS IN ADDITION TO THOSE ARGUED IN THE FIRST 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF AND IN THE AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF 32 
VIII. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ERRORS OF THE TRIAL 
COURT, THE MISCONDUCT OF THE PROSECUTOR, AND THE INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL DENIED DEFENDANT A FAIR OPPORTUNITY 
TO PRESENT HIS DEFENCE 39 
CONCLUSIONS 4 2 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 43 
CASES CITED 
Berger v U.S., 295 US 78 23 
Chapman v California, 386 US 18 24 
Government of the Virgin Islands v Joseph, 765 F2nd 394 . . . 11 
Griffin v California, 380 US 609 24 
Phillips v Lane, 787 F2nd 208 11 
State v Codianna, 573 P2nd 343 10 
State v Fisher, 680 P2nd 35 20 
State v Salcido, 681 P2nd 925 27, 30 
State v Sargent, 698 P2nd 598 27, 30 
State v Schoenfeld, 545 P2nd 193 10 
State v Shad, 470 P2nd 246 10 
State v Smith, 420 P2nd 278 25 
State v Speer, 750 P2nd 186 20, 32 
State v St. Clair, 282 P2nd 323 10, 39 
State v Tillman, 750 P2nd 546 20 
State v Wood, 648 P2nd 71 11, 31, 34 
U.S. v Guzman, 781 F2nd 428 11, 12 
U.S. v Handman, 447 F2nd 853 24 
U.S. v Valdes-Guerra, 758 F2nd 1411 23 
U.S.v Flannery, 451 F.lnd 880 25 
United States v Marquardt, 786 F2nd 771 13 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS CITED 
Constitution of the United States, 5th Amendment 24, 37 
6th Amendment 37 
14th Amendment 24 
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 4 17 
STATUTES and RULES CITED 
76-3-207(2) 37 
76-5-201 3, 12, 13 
76-5-202 3, 12, 33, 40 
78-2-4(1) 17 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 615 28, 29 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: 
Amendment 5. 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise 
infamous crime , unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in 
the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; ,nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation. 
Amendment 6. 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and 
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
Constitution of the United States (continued): 
Amendment 14, Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny 'to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of laws. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH: 
Article VIII, Section 4. 
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and 
evidence to be used in the courts of the state and shall by rule 
manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a 
vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the 
Legislature. Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, 
the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and 
judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties. Judges pro 
tempore shall be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, 
and admitted to practice law in Utah. The Supreme Court by rule 
Constitution of Utah 
Article VIII, Section 4 (continued): 
shall govern the practice of law and the conduct and discipline 
of persons admitted to practice law. 
UTAH CODE, 1953, as amended: 
Section 76-3-207(2). 
(2) In these sentencing proceedings, evidence may be 
presented as to any matter the court deems relevant to the 
sentence, including but not limited to nature and circumstances 
of the crime, the defendant's character, background, history, 
mental and physical condition, and any other fact in aggravation 
or mitigation of the penalty. Any evidence the court deems to 
have probative force may be received regardless of its 
admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence. The 
state's attorney and the defendant shall be permitted to present 
argument for or against sentence of death. Aggravating 
circumstances shall include those as outlined in 76-5-202. 
Mitigating circumstances shall include the following: 
(a) - (g) [omitted] 
Utah Code, 1953, as amended (continued): 
Section 76-5-201. 
(1) A person commits criminal homicide if he intentionally, 
knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negligence or acting with a 
mental state otherwise specified in the statute defining the 
offense, causes the death of another human being, including an 
unborn child. There shall be no cause of action for criminal 
homicide against a mother or a physician for the death of an 
unborn child caused by an abortion where the abortion was 
permitted by law and the required consent was lawfully given. 
(2) Criminal homicide is murder in the first and second 
degree, manslaughter, negligent homicide, or automobile homicide. 
Section 76-5-202 (l)(q). 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first degree 
if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of 
another under any of the following circumstances: 
(q) The homicide was committed in an especially heinous, 
atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved manner, any of which 
must be demonstrated by physical torture, serious physical abuse, 
or serious bodily injury of the victim before deach. 
Utah Code, 1953, as amended (continued): 
Section 78-2-4(1). 
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and 
evidence for use of the courts of the state and shall by rule 
manage the appellate process. The legislature may amend the rules 
of procedure and evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a 
vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the 
Legislature. 
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STATEMENT 
1 On March 8, 1988, pursuant to the pro-se Motion of 
2 Defendant, Defendant's appointed appellate counsel was discharged 
3 and this counsel was appointed to brief the Court on the nine 
4 issues raised by Defendant in his pro-se Motion for Reversal of 
5 Appellant's December 18th, 1985, Conviction and orally argue the 
6 same nine issues. 
7 Accordingly, this brief argues those nine issues, albeit in 
8 a somewhat rearranged, consolidated, and re-numbered order, 
9 omitting certain of Defendant's citations considered by this 
10 counsel not to be relevant and with additional points and 
11 authorities considered by this counsel to be pertinent to the 
12 particular argument. The rearrangement, editing, omissions and 
1 
1 additions of this brief are not meant to denigrate or abandon any 
2 of Defendant's pro-se arguments; if it is determined by any 
3 Justice that any of the points of this brief differs 
4 significantly from the arguments for any of the issues raised by 
5 Defendant, himself, deference should be given to Defendant's own 
6 arguments, as this counsel considers this appointment to be for 
7 the purpose clarifying and providing proper legal support for 
8 Defendant's own arguments and not for the purpose of supplanting 
9 them. 
.0 Neither is it the.intent of this brief to contest the 
.1 arguments previously argued by Defendant's former appointed 
2 appellate counsel or by Amicus, except as may be specifically set 
3 forth herein. 
4 STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED IN THIS BRIEF 
5 1. Was Defendant prejudiced by duplicitous charges contained 
6 in the Information? 
7 2. Should the alleged confession of Defendant have been 
3 suppressed for the reason that it was not a verbatim 
) transcription of his own words, but rather was drafted and 
) dictated by an investigating officer. 
2 
1 3. Was Defendant prejudiced by the trial court's allowance 
2 of an investigating and testifying officer to assist the 
3 prosecution at counsel table throughout the course of the trial? 
4 4. Is Defendant prejudiced from effectively appealing for 
5 the reason that no record was made of the peremptory challenges? 
6 5. Should Defendant's conviction be reversed because of 
7 certain prosecutorial misconduct? 
8 6. Was Defendant denied effective assistance of counsel for 
9 reasons in addition to those raised in the first Supplemental 
10 Brief and in the Amicus Curiae Brief and should Defendant's 
11 conviction and/or sentence of death be vacated and the matter 
12 remanded for new trial and or penalty phase? 
13 7. Does the cumulative effect of the various errors 
14 committed by the trial court, omissions of his defense counsel, 
15 and prosecutorial misconduct demand that Defendant's conviction 
16 and/or sentence of death be vacated and the matter remanded for 
17 new trial and/or penalty phase? 
18 FACTS 
19 Defendant was charged by Information dated 12 April, 1985, 
20 charging him with a violation of Sections 76-5-201 and 76-5-202, 
21 Utah Criminal Code, as amended (R. 26). Defendant made an initial 
22 appearance before the Honorable G. Gordon Knudsen, Judge, Eighth 
3 
1 Circuit Court, on the 14th of June, 1985, at which hearing it was 
2 noted that Duke McNeil of Chicago had been retained as 
3 Defendant's attorney (R. 4 - 5 ) . Preliminary examination was held 
4 on 25 June, 1985, with Mr. McNeil appearing for Defendant. The 
5 record indicates that on 29 November, 1985, counsel for Defendant 
6 filed a Motion to Suppress Statements (R. 41) and a Notice of 
7 Insanity Defense or in the Alternative Defense of Diminished 
8 Mental Capacity (R. 50) and a Motion for Change of Venue (R. 
9 51). It does not appear from the record that counsel for the 
L0 Defendant filed other motions or requested discovery from the 
LI prosecution. 
.2 A hearing to set the trial date was held on the date of the 
.3 filing of the Notice of Insanity Defense, on 29 November, 1985 
.4 (R. 55). Defendant did not appear at such hearing. A further 
5 hearing on all pre-trial motions was conducted on 9 December, 
6 1985, Defendant appeared personally at such subsequent hearing 
7 where testimony was introduced and argument made regarding the 
8 motions for suppression and change of venue (R. 239 - 401). 
9 However, only one brief exchange was had between counsel and the 
0 court regarding the alienist's reports, and no specific reference 
1 was made to the insanity defense (R. 398). Defendant asserts that 
2 his counsel did not consult with him or give him prior notice of 
4 
1 the insanity defense notice and that he would not have consented 
2 to such defense because he wished to pursue the defense that he 
3 was not guilty because he did not do the acts alleged in the 
4 Information, not that he did the acts but was insane or of 
5 diminished mental capacity. Defendant further asserts that he was 
6 not informed of or prepared for the examinations conducted by 
7 the two court-appointed alienists at the Utah County Jail. The 
8 insanity defense notice was later withdrawn on 11 December, 1985, 
9 pursuant to Defendant's motion (R 64 - 65). 
10 Trial of the matter was eventually commenced on 12 December, 
11 1985. The Information was read to the jury verbatim by the trial 
12 court (R. 1046). Prior to opening statements, counsel for 
13 Defendant moved for exclusion of all witnesses (R. 1035). 
14 Despite the court's favorable ruling on such motion and without 
15 objection from Defendant's counsel or designation or proffer of 
16 proof that he was essential to the presentation of the State's 
17 case, Lieutenant George Pierpont of the Provo City Police 
18 Department was allowed to remain in the courtroom and assist the 
19 prosecutor throughout the trial (R. 1041). 
20 Lieutenant Pierpont was called as the State's fourth witness 
21 on the fourth day of trial and testified that on 12 April, 1985, 
5 
1 in the jail located in the Metropolitan Safety Building of 
2 Nashville Tennessee, Defendant, who had been arrested the 
3 previous day by Nashville police officers, signed a document 
4 entitled STATEMENT FORM (R. 219). Lieutenant Pierpont further 
5 testified that the document was signed after a brief interview of 
6 Defendant conducted by officer Pierpont and another Provo City 
7 Police Officer, Sergeant Stan Egan, and that the substance of 
8 such document was dictated by him (Pierpont) to a stenographer of 
9 the Nashville Metropolitan Police Department after the interview 
10 of Defendant and that Defendant reviewed and signed the document 
11 in the officer's presence after it had been transcribed by the 
12 stenographer (R. 1189 - 1192). In addition to the Motion to 
13 Suppress and hearing thereon noted herein-above, objection to 
14 introduction of the statement was made at trial by counsel for 
15 Defendant (R. 1184 - 1185). Lieutenant Pierpont was later 
16 recalled for further examination as the State's final witness (R. 
17 1336). Officer Egan did not testify at trial. 
L8 Counsel for Defendant requested and was granted instructions 
19 on the lesser included offenses of murder in the second degree 
20 (R. 144, 147 - 148) and manslaughter (R. 150 - 151) (also R. 154 
11 and 177). Defendant asserts that he was not consulted prior to 
22 his counsel 's request for these lesser included instructions and 
6 
1 that had he been consulted he would not have approved such 
2 requests, again for the reason that he did and does maintain that 
3 he was not guilty because he did not commit the acts alleged in 
4 the Information, not because he did the acts but may have been 
5 guilty of one of the lesser included offenses. Defendant was 
6 found guilty as charged of murder in the first degree (R. 220 -
7 222). 
8 At the penalty stage of Defendant's trial his counsel 
9 presented the reports of the two court-appointed alienists by 
10 having the clerk read each into the record (R. 1411 - 1429). No 
11 other evidence was offered to establish mitigating factors in 
12 support of the argument for a sentence of life imprisonment. The 
13 jury rendered a verdict of death (R. 223). 
14 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
15 It was error for the trial court to read the Information to 
16 the jury as the Information contained duplicate reference to the 
17 same offense. Such duplication prejudiced the Defendant. 
18 Defendant is prevented from effectively and completely 
19 arguing on appeal as no record was kept of the peremptory 
20 challenges exercised by the parties. 
7 
1 The trial court erred in allowing introduction of 
2 Defendant's written "confession" as such writing memorialized the 
3 statements of the investigating officer and not the statements 
4 and words of Defendant, himself. This Court should rule that in 
5 capital cases and cases of similar magnitude, purported 
6 statements and confessions be verbatim transcriptions of the 
7 questioning and responses, or if not verbatim, at least supported 
8 by back-up stenographic or electronic recording of the 
9 questioning and the declarant's actual statement. 
10 
11 In his closing argument at the guilt stage, the prosecution 
12 made repeated improper reference to facts not admitted into 
13 evidence, to Defendant's exercise of his right not to testify, 
14 and vouched for a State's witnesses. Such misconduct was not 
15 properly cured by contemporaneous instruction and allowed the 
16 jury to deliberate on issues not properly before it, thus 
L7 unfairly prejudicing Defendant. 
L8 The trial court erred in allowing the chief investigating 
L9 officer to remain at the State's prosecution table throughout the 
10 entire course of the trial to assist the prosecutor as well as 
11 testify, although his presence at counsel table was not shown to 
12 be necessary to the State's presentation of its case and in fact 
8 
1 was not necessary. In capital cases and cases of like magnitude, 
2 this court should rule that such procedure is improper as it 
3 tends to suggest that the prestige of the State is behind such 
4 witness. 
5 Defendant's counsel's representation was below an objective 
6 standard of competence generally, and specifically at the penalty 
7 stage. Such demonstrable deficiencies prejudiced the outcome of 
8 Defendant's trial and raises a reasonable doubt as to the 
9 fairness of the jury's verdicts. 
10 
11 The cumulative effect of the trial court's errors, 
12 prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of defence 
13 counsel resulted in a denial of a fair opportunity for Defendant 
14 to present his defenses and raises reasonable doubt that the 
15 outcome of the guilt/innocence and/or penalty stage would have 
16 been the same absent such errors and omissions. 
17 This court should review the entire record of the 
18 proceedings in this matter in order to determine if the finding 
19 of guilt and the death penalty are appropriate, notwithstanding 
20 Defense counsel 's failure object or take exception to the various 
21 claimed errors at the trial level and notwithstanding the failure 
9 
1 of counsel to raise relevant issues either in this brief or 
2 others filed on Defendant's behalf. 
3 ARGUMENT 
4 I 
5 NUMEROUS CASES FROM THIS COURT PROVIDE THAT THE ENTIRE 
6 RECORD OF CAPITAL CASES SHOULD BE REVIEWED AND ALL ERRORS 
7 CONSIDERED - SUA SPONTE IF NECESSARY - IF IT APPEARS THAT THE 
8 INTERESTS OF JUSTICE REQUIRE. 
9 This brief will raise and argue several issues of claimed 
10 error and prejudice, some of which have not been properly raised 
11 at the trial level. Under normal standards of review, Defendant 
12 would be prevented from raising such matters anew on appeal. 
13 Nevertheless, this Court has, itself, declared that its duty in 
14 capital cases extends to consideration of error even if not 
15 raised below. See cases cited in point I of Amicus Curiae Brief 
16 as well as State v Schoenfeld, 545 P2nd 193; State v Codianna, 
17 573 P2nd 343; State v Shad, 470 P2nd 246. 
18 Further, this Court has ruled that-
19 [w]hile we will not ordinarily raise questions of 
20 error on our own motion, ...it is well established that 
21 in capital cases when the interests of justice so 
22 require the entire proceeding should be reviewed to 
23 determine whether errors occurred as a consequence of 
24 which the accused did not have a fair trial, even 
25 though not assigned and argued. State v St. Clair, 282 
26 P2nd 323. 
10 
1 Consequently, this Court should consider issues raised for 
2 the first time in this brief or in the briefs previously filed 
3 for Defendant. It should also review the entire record for issues 
4 that may have not been briefed, as this Court will undoubtedly 
5 note from the various briefs that justice requires such a 
6 complete review, in light of the many points raised in the 
7 various briefs, in light of the substantial doubt as to the legal 
8 sufficiency of Defendant's trial counsel and in light of its 
9 long standing ruling that-
10 [w]e reject the proposition that the death penalty 
11 may be imposed when there is substantial doubt whether 
12 it should be. State v Wood, 648 P2nd 71. 
13 This position to consider plain error is consistent with 
14 the position of other jurisdictions. See U.S. v Guzman, 781 F2nd 
15 428; Phillips v Lane, 787 F2nd 208; Government of the Virgin 
16 Islands v Joseph, 765 F2nd 394. In reviewing the briefs (and 
17 hopefully, the entire record) this Court will discover several 
18 instances of plain error that may or may not have been raised 
19 below and that may or may not have been argued here. This Court 
20 should, nevertheless, consider any and all errors that cast 
21 substantial doubt on the "fairness, integrity or public 
22 reputation of [the] judicial proceedings" conducted below, 
11 
1 Guzman, supra, to determine whether the verdicts of guilt and 
2 death were properly reached. 
3 II 
4 IN THE STATE'S CITING TWO STATUTES IN THE INFORMATION AND 
5 THE COURT'S READING THE INFORMATION TO THE JURY, DEFENDANT WAS 
6 PREJUDICED IN THAT THE JURY WAS LEAD TO BELIEVE THAT DEFENDANT 
7 WAS CHARGED WITH TWO SEPARATE OFFENSES. 
8 The Information filed in this matter charged Defendant with 
9 violations of Sections 76-5-201 and 76-5-202, Utah Criminal Code, 
10 as amended (R. 26). The Information was read to the jury, 
11 verbatim, by the trial judge, himself, prior to opening argument 
12 (R. 1046). The charging and reading of the two separate statutes 
13 implies the State's allegation that Defendant had committed two 
14 unrelated offenses. This possible implication was compounded by 
15 the court's instructions which made no reference to the meaning 
16 or import of Section 76-5-201 to the matter at hand. 
17 Instruction No. 6 applies the language of Section 76-5-202 
18 to the alleged facts of the case (R. 141); but no reference was 
19 made to che meaning or significance of Section 76-5-201 or why 
20 two statutes were cited in the Information, probably because 
21 Section 76-5-201 was not necessary to a complete presentation of 
12 
1 the facts or law relevant to the State's charges. The unnecessary 
2 charging and reading of the reference to both statutes without an 
3 explanatory instruction on why two were cited served no legal 
4 purpose but left the jury with the possible impression that 
5 another charge lingered against Defendant and created the 
6 implication of more criminal activity than the State was entitled 
7 to charge. See United States v Marquardty 786 F2nd 771. 
8 If it were in fact necessary for a complete charging of the 
9 alleged offense that both statutes be included in the 
10 Information, and if it were in fact necessary for the jury's 
11 complete understanding of the charge that the court make 
12 reference to both statutes, then it was also necessary that an 
13 explanatory instruction be included to inform the jury of both 
14 sections' significance to the charge. However, Instruction No. 6 
15 sets forth a complete allegation of the charge and the facts 
16 without need to draw on any of the language of Section 76-5-201. 
17 Consequently, it appears that Section 76-5-201 was unnecessary to 
18 the State's case or the jury's understanding of the charge and 
19 that both should not have been cited and read to the jury. 
20 There is a substantial likelihood that the unnecessary 
21 reading of the two statutes, when one would have sufficed, 
13 
1 without further explanation or instruction, created more 
2 questions than answers in the minds of the jury and prejudiced 
3 Defendant by implying another unexplained and unarticulated 
4 offense, creating the substantial likelihood that the jury's 
5 guilt and sentence verdicts were rendered partially on the jury's 
6 belief that Defendant was a "bad person". 
7 
8 III 
9 DEFENDANT IS PREVENTED FROM FULLY PRESENTING ARGUMENTS ON 
10 APPEAL FOR THE REASON THAT NO RECORD WAS MADE OF THE PARTIES' 
11 EXERCISE OF THEIR PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES. 
12 The parties commenced exercise of their respective 
13 peremptory challenges on the morning of 16 December and 
14 then halted before finishing their challenges in order to recess 
15 to accommodate Defendant's counsel's need to retrieve certain 
16 material expected to be flown in from his home office (R. 1026). 
17 The court reconvened that afternoon at which time the remainder 
18 of the parties' respective peremptory challenges were exercised 
19 (R. 1033). The record only briefly indicates the above-noted 
20 occurrences without further comment or memorialization. 
21 Defendant asserts that the silence of the record in this 
22 regard prevents him from discovering possible error in the 
23 exercise of these privileges; this counsel has been unable to 
14 
1 find case law bearing on this issue with which to advise this 
2 Court. 
3 IV 
4 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING A PURPORTED STATEMENT 
5 FROM DEFENDANT AND THIS COURT SHOULD RULE THAT IN CAPITAL CASES 
6 AND MATTERS OF SIMILAR MAGNITUDE, TO BE ADMISSIBLE, ALLEGED 
7 CONFESSIONS SHOULD BE VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTIONS OF THE DECLARANT'S 
8 OWN WORDS, MEMORIALIZED BY A STENOGRAPHICALLY OR ELECTRONICALLY 
9 RECORDED RECORD OF THE DECLARANT'S SPOKEN STATEMENT OR BY AN 
10 ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF EQUAL RELIABILITY. 
11 A statement (R. 219, State's exhibit no. 26) attributed to 
12 Defendant was admitted into evidence on foundation provided by 
13 the testimony of Lieutenant George Pierpont of the Provo City 
14 Police Department (R. 1193). Objection was taken to the admission 
15 of the statement (R. 1184 - 1185 and 1193). The statement was 
16 also the subject of a pre-trial Motion to Suppress Statements (R. 
17 41) which was argued (R. 249 - 357) and denied prior to trial by 
18 the trial court which found it was voluntarily given by Defendant 
19 (R. 357). 
20 The procedure used to take and record the purported 
21 statement was explained by Lieutenant Pierpont on direct 
15 
1 examination (R. 1189 - 1193) and again on cross examination (R. 
2 1211 - 1216). The information contained in the writing was 
3 dictated to a police secretary by officer Pierpont after he had 
4 conducted a brief interview of Defendant in the presence of 
5 officers Cunningham of the Nashville Metropolitan Police 
6 Department and Egan of the Provo Police Department. The writing 
7 was then presented to Defendant for his signature. The writing, 
8 therefore, is actually a memorialization of officer Pierpont's 
9 statement of the facts he claims were related to him by 
10 Defendant; it comprises the words, phrases, and terminology of 
11 officer Pierpont, not of Defendant. The State did not urge, and 
12 it does not appear that the procedure used to record the 
13 purported statement was necessary because of unusual or exigent 
14 circumstances; rather the method used was one of convenience and 
15 departmental policy. 
16 As noted, defense counsel filed and argued a motion asking 
17 for suppression of the statement for the reason that it was not 
18 voluntarily given. It is not clear whether counsel also objected 
19 to the statement's admission for the separate reason that the 
20 method used to take the statement - in and of itself - was 
21 prejudicial, although counsel did argue that it was improper and 
22 bore on the issue of voluntariness. Nevertheless, it is urged 
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1 here that this Courtf pursuant to powers granted by the 
2 Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 4, and Section 78-2-
3 4(1) , Utah Code, promulgate a rule that in capital cases and 
4 matters of similar magnitude, in addition to all other 
5 foundational requirements, to be admissible, statements bearing 
6 directly on the alleged offense taken by investigating officers, 
7 purportedly made by an accused, in a custodial setting, be 
8 preserved by stenographic or electronic recordings of the 
9 verbatim spoken words of the declarant, or by another method 
10 equally reliable in its ability to memorialize the accused's own 
11 spoken or written words. 
12 Such methods would more nearly preserve the actual nuances, 
13 inflections, emotions, and emphasis of the declarant as well as 
14 provide defense counsel, the court, and the jury with a more 
15 accurate record of the methods used to extract the statement and 
16 protect against undue influence and intimidation. A more accurate 
17 record of the entire interrogation process is especially relevant 
18 in a situation such as this where Defendant claims the statement 
19 was involuntarily induced and where he chooses to exercise his 
20 right not to testify and as a consequjnce the jury is left with 
21 only a cold and technical impression of Defendant, personally, 
22 and an uncaring and matter-of-fact account of events in the words 
17 
1 of the investigator, emphasizing what the investigator feels is 
2 important to the development of the case, and essentially 
3 omitting any of the humanity of the accused. Attributing the 
4 words of another to the Defendant, himself, undermines his right 
5 not to testify. 
6 Neither would the safeguards unduly burden the police 
7 responsibilities of the State. Such methods of preservation are 
8 readily available in most, if not all, modern police facilities, 
9 and if they are not, they would certainly be available from an 
10 outside source such as a nearby court, without undue delay or 
11 expense. And as this case illustrates, to do otherwise is more 
12 often a choice of convenience rather than necessity. 
13 Where the accused's life is in the balance, where modern 
14 methods of preservation are readily available, where the burden 
15 to the State is minimal, and where - as in this instance - an 
16 accused's purported statement is undoubtedly the most pivotal 
17 and focused-upon item of evidence, it would seem appropriate that 
18 the jury be given the best evidence. At both the guilt and 
19 penalty stages it is critical that the jury know and judge for 
20 themselves whether there was remorse, tears, fears, concern for 
21 the victim or family, pressure, intimidation, or promises. And, 
18 
1 of course, more accurate methods of preserving a statement would 
2 better enable the court to make assessments of the voluntariness 
3 of the statement and the completeness of the explanation and 
4 understanding of rights. 
5 It is recognized that such protections may not be 
6 appropriate or necessary in every police interrogation, but in 
7 capital cases where the consequences are severe and mitigating 
8 circumstances are critical to the jury's determination of the 
9 penalty, the court and jury as well as the Defendant are 
10 entitled to the best evidence that is reasonably available. This 
11 can be assured by such extraordinary procedures. 
12 Whereas this Defendant was denied the best evidence of his 
13 purported statement, whereas such denial was unfairly 
14 capitalized upon in the prosecution's closing argument (as is 
15 argued hereinbelow), and whereas no immediate cautionary 
16 instructions to disregard such improper capitalization were given 
17 by the court, this Court should reverse Defendant's conviction, 
18 remand for new trial and rule the purported statement of 
19 Defendant inadmissable. 
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1 V 
2 IMPROPER STATEMENTS MADE BY THE PROSECUTION IN CLOSING 
3 ARGUMENT UNDULY PREJUDICED DEFENDANT AND RAISE REASONABLE DOUBT 
4 AS TO WHETHER THE JURY CONFINED ITS DELIBERATION TO LEGALLY 
5 ADMITTED EVIDENCE. 
6 This Court has ruled that-
7 [i]n reviewing a claim of prosecutorial 
8 misconduct, we must determine if the prosecutor's 
9 remarks calls to the attention of the jurors matters 
10 they would not be justified in considering in reaching 
11 the verdict and, if so, whether there is a reasonable 
12 likelihood that the misconduct so prejudiced the jury 
13 that there would have been a more favorable result 
14 absent the misconduct. State v Speer, 750 P2nd 186, 
15 citing State v Tillman, 750 P2nd 546; Also see State v 
16 Fisher, 680 P2nd 35. 
17 
18 Defendant asserts that several improper prosecutorial 
19 arguments were left uncured by the court with the result that the 
20 jury was allowed to consider facts not properly before them 
21 and/or which unfairly prejudiced their deliberations in favor of 
22 the State. The improper statements were of three types: 
23 misstatements of facts, comments on the Defendant's exercise of 
24 his right to remain silent, and vouching for a State's witness. 
25 Misstatements of facts. 
26 As has been argued, Defendant challenged introduction of his 
27 purported statement at the pre-trial and trial stages and this 
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1 brief has urged that this Court adopt a rule that would provide 
2 for a more fair and accurate record of the circumstances and 
3 substance of any purported statements from an accused in a 
4 capital case. Interestingly, the need for a better record of the 
5 taking and exact nature of the statement is best illustrated by 
6 the prosecution's adroit, yet improper, references to the 
7 statement in closing argument. Counsel pointed out that ff[t]he 
8 defendant in his own statement, in his own confession, tells you 
9 that 'After I stabbed her eight times 'in the back she was still 
10 moaning and gasping.'" (R. 1344 - 1345). Later, the prosecutor 
11 argued, "We know that because Ms. Oleson, according to his 
12 [Defendant's] own mouth, dropped the knife in the kitchen after 
13 he ordered her to do so " (R. 1349). Again, he argued "The 
14 man who can commit those acts, can write them down for you in a 
15 confession ... deserves to be found guilty...." (R. 1354). 
16 Finally, in rebuttal, the prosecutor noted "[t]here is only one 
17 person in this room who was an eye-witness to the murder of Eva 
18 Oleson...[h]e has provided for you by his own mouth each and 
19 every element of the crimes that are set forth in first degree 
20 murder." (R. 1387). 
21 But, exhibit No. 26 was not the Defendant's "own 
22 statement;" it was not "according to [Defendant's] own mouth;" 
21 
1 Defendant did not "write them down;" the words were not "provided 
2 ... by [Defendant's] own mouth." The statement was officer 
3 Pierpont's; it was according to officer Pierpont's own mouth; and 
4 the stenographer wrote them down as they were provided by officer 
5 Pierpont's own mouth. It was improper for the prosecutor to argue 
6 that the words of the statement were Defendant's when they 
7 weren't; it was wrong to imply Defendant chose and mouthed the 
8 actual word when he didn't, when the evidence that the words of 
9 the writing were exclusively officer Pierpont's was 
10 uncontroverted. 
11 While at first glance, it might appear harmless to attribute 
12 the words of the statement directly to Defendant, it must be 
13 remembered that Defendant argued he had signed the document only 
14 after improper inducement and that the substance of the 
15 statement was untrue; whether the statement was voluntarily 
16 signed and whether the statement was true were still contested 
17 issues. To state that the words of the statement were Defendant's 
18 own was to connote that those issues had been decided against 
19 Defendant. It was, however, the jury's prerogative to decide 
20 those issues. 
22 
1 Further, with all due respect to officer Pierpont, the 
2 statement is comprised of classic police-report phraseology and 
3 reads like a technical document. In a case where the jury is to 
4 eventually determine, based on a consideration of the aggravating 
5 and mitigating factors, whether the Defendant should be sentenced 
6 to death, to attribute the dispassionate and remote tone of the 
7 writing directly to Defendant is to subtly imply the existence 
8 of an aggravating factor that is not factually founded in the 
9 writing. 
10 If it is civilly wrong to make unfair use of another's words 
11 then it is certainly improper in this capital case to 
12 inaccurately attribute the words of an investigating officer to 
13 the Defendant. Such improper references suggested to the jury 
14 that Defendant approved of the words and truthfulness of the 
15 statement and additionally that Defendant, himself, mouthed the 
16 words in the cold, hard fashion they appear in the writing. 
17 If[W]hile [the prosecutor] may strike hard blows, he is not at 
18 liberty to strike foul ones." Berger v U.S., 295 US 78; U.S. v 
19 Valdes-Guerra, 758 F2nd 1411. The misstatements of fact 
20 prejudiced the jury at both the guilt and penalty stages and 
21 require reversal of Defendant's conviction. 
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1 Comments on failure to testify* 
2 In his final words of rebuttal, the prosecutor argued to the 
3 jury-
4 I heard no evidence, evidence, [sic] from the 
5 witness stand about coercion or about inducing somebody 
6 to say anything about something that didn't happen. I 
7 heard no evidence that supports any other theory in 
8 this case than the theory that was presented by the 
9 State of Utah, that he is guilty of first degree 
LO murder. (R. 1386). 
LI The Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that the 
L2 Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution by way of the 
L3 Fourteenth Amendment forbids the prosecution's commenting on a 
L4 defendant's choice to exercise his right not to testify, Griffin 
L5 v California, 380 US 609; and that although such a comment can be 
.6 considered harmless error, the burden is on the prosecution to 
L7 establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the comment was not 
L8 prejudicial to the defendant, Chapman v California, 386 US 18. 
.9 Other federal decisions have ruled that references to the 
10 exercise of the right to remain silent do not have to be explicit 
21 but must be judged by what the jury probably thought, U.S. v 
>2 Handman, 447 F2nd 853. 
13 Some jurisdictions have expanded the federal protection that 
!4 forbids comment on a defendant's exercise of the right by ruling 
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1 that any comment is prejudicial per-se, requiring automatic 
2 reversal. See U.S.v Flannery, 451 F2nd 880 (1st Cir.); State v 
3 Smith, 420 P2nd 278 (Az.); Flaherty v State, 183 So2nd 607 
4 (Fla.); State v Wright, 205 So2nd 324 (La.); Sanders v State, 392 
5 SW2nd 916 (Tenn.); People v Alexander, 169 NW2nd 652 (Mich.); 
6 State v Chunn, 657 SW2nd 292 (Mo.). While others subscribe to the 
7 federal rule that the court must place the burden on the 
8 prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v Davis, 212 
9 A2nd 19 (N.J.); Commonwealth v Reichard, 233 A2nd 603 (Pa.); 
10 State v Martin, 498 P2nd 1370 (N.M.); State v Gladue, 677 P2nd 
11 1228 (Mont.). Several states consider the right to remain silent 
12 so fundamental that a violation of the right will be reviewed on 
13 appeal even absent a proper objection at trial. See State v 
14 Smith, supra (Az.); State v Chasse, 230 A2nd 51 (Conn.); 
15 Singleton v State, 183 So2nd 245 (Fla). 
16 This Court has ruled that any reasonable doubt as to 
17 prejudice that may have occurred by reason of a comment on the 
18 failure of the defendant to testify must be resolved in favor of 
19 the defendant, State v Eaton, 569 P2nd 1114. Counsel's comment 
20 can fairly be interpreted as being in reference to the 
21 Defendant's choice not to testify and gives rise to reasonable 
22 doubt that the jury was thereby prejudiced. 
25 
1 Although the prosecutor did not specifically refer to 
2 Defendant in his comments, it is clear that only one person could 
3 have provided the evidence that was pointed out as missing. Since 
4 Defendant was alone during the entire interrogation process in 
5 Nashville he was the only possible witness who was in a position 
6 to give evidence "about coercion or about inducing somebody to 
7 say anything about something that didn't happen," Similarly, 
8 since the main issue at the trial was not that a murd€>r didn't 
9 occur or that there were jurisdictional or limitation 
10 restrictions, etc, but simply whether or not Defendant was the 
11 offender, counsel's comment that he had "heard no other theory in 
12 this case than the theory that was presented by the State of 
13 Utah," can also be fairly interpreted as a reference to 
14 Defendant's failure to take the stand to deny the accusations or 
15 to offer his alibi. These comments go beyond a statement on the 
L6 paucity of the defence, generally, and can only logically be 
L7 considered as veiled comments on the failure of the Defendant, 
L8 himself, to testify. 
.9 When viewed in light of the lack of any objection and the 
!0 lack of a contemporaneous admonition by the court to disregard 
!l the comments, there is reasonable doubt that some or most or all 
2 of the members of the jury understood that they were obliged not 
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1 to draw any adverse conclusion from Defendant's decision not to 
2 testify. Since Defendant has established prime facia evidence of 
3 an improper comment on his choice not to testify, this Court 
4 should consider the argument that this fundamental right was 
5 violated by the comments, notwithstanding defense counsel's 
6 failure to object and should resolve the reasonable doubt that 
7 Defendant was thereby prejudiced in favor of Defendant. 
8 Vouching. 
9 The prosecutor further commented regarding a State's witness 
10 that fl[y]ou know, Lucia Tovar to me was one of the most 
11 impressive witnesses in this particular case. She told you in all 
12 honesty everything that she saw." (R. 1353). It is generally held 
13 that it is improper for a prosecutor to express a personal belief 
14 in the credibility of a witness People v Smith, 685 P2nd 786; 
15 U.S. v Dennis, 786 F2nd 1029; or to otherwise vouch for a witness 
16 and place the integrity and prestige of the government behind the 
17 witness State v Sargent, 698 P2nd 598; State v Salcido, 681 P2nd 
18 925. 
19 Admittedly, this reference is isolated and was not repeated 
20 or unduly emphasized by the prosecutor. Nevertheless, it was 
21 clearly an improper statement of his personal belief in the 
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1 credibility of Mrs. Tovar. And, when coupled with the previously 
2 noted instances of improper comments on the part of the 
3 prosecutor, which were also unchallenged and unadmonished, one is 
4 left with reasonable doubt that the jury was without prejudice 
5 against Defendant and that the outcome of their deliberations 
6 would not have produced a result more favorable to Defendant, but 
7 for such improper comments. 
8 VI 
9 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE STATE'S CHIEF 
10 INVESTIGATIVE OFFICER TO REMAIN AT COUNSEL TABLE THROUGHOUT THE 
11 TRIAL AND TO TESTIFY FOR THE PROSECUTION. 
12 Lieutenant George Pierpont of the Provo City Police 
L3 Department led the investigation of the crime charged in this 
L4 case. After Defendant's arrest in Nashville, Tennessee, he, along 
.5 with Provo City Sergeant Stan Egan, flew to Nashville, where 
.6 they interviewed Defendant (1190). Thereafter, Lieutenant 
.7 Pierpont dictated Defendant's purported statement to a Nashville 
8 police secretary for typing. 
9 
0 At trial, defense counsel requested and was granted 
1 exclusion of witnesses, pursuant to Rule 615 of Utah Rules of 
2 Evidence (R. 1035). However, without any showing of need, 
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1 Lieutenant Pierpont was allowed to remain at the prosecution 
2 table as part of a 3-man prosecution team including the chief 
3 prosecutor and his assistantf Beverly Ramsey (R. 1041). Officer 
4 Pierpont eventually testified, first as the State's fourth 
5 witness (R. 1180) and later was recalled as the State's final 
6 witness (R. 1336) . 
.7 
8 It is recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule 
9 is generally considered to be to insure independence of 
10 recollection and that investigative officers have been considered 
11 to be "an officer or employee of a party which is not a natural 
12 person designated as its representative by its attorney" thus 
13 fitting into the exception set forth in Rule 615(2), U.S. v 
14 Maestas, 523 F2nd 316; U.S. v Pellegrino, 470 F2nd 1205; State v 
15 McGrath, 749 P2nd 631. It is also recognized that officer 
16 Pierpont's testimony probably was not susceptible to influence 
17 from other witnesses in as much as it was confined to facts 
18 concerning the taking of the purported statement from Defendant 
19 and to the search for the suspected murder weapon, neither of 
20 which was the subject of any other witnesses' testimony. 
21 However, this Court is urged to consider the prejudicial 
22 effect of the officer's continued presence at counsel table for 
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1 another reason. As was noted hereinabove in argument No. V, the 
2 State is not permitted to place the prestige and integrity of the 
3 government behind its witness, State v Sargent, supra; State v 
4 Salcidof supra. Obviously, this occurs when the prosecutor 
5 directly vouches for a witness as was done in the instance of 
6 Mrs. Tovar. But, it also occurred more subtly with regard to 
7 Officer Pierpont. In twice rising from counsel table to take the 
8 stand, he testified as one of the prosecution team - almost as if 
9 the prosecutor, himself, were giving testimony. 
10 This may be a necessary, proper, and acceptable procedure in 
11 the day-to-day prosecutions that regularly take place in every 
12 Circuit and District Court. It would not be reasonable to prevent 
13 the arresting officer in the vast majority of cases from 
L4 assisting counsel at the table, especially where counsel may have 
L5 the responsibility for the prosecution of several cases, may 
.6 have had limited opportunity to familiarize himself with the 
.7 case, and would be unreasonably hampered without the assistance 
8 of the officer. 
9 But here, where the case involves a capital offense, where 
0 trial was held some seven months after the preliminary 
1 examination, where the lead prosecutor had the assistance of co-
30 
1 counsel, where other officers were also available to testify as 
2 to the substance of officer Pierpont's testimony (Officers 
3 Cunningham and Egan) or alternatively to take Officer Pierpont's 
4 place at counsel table, and where the credibility of Officer 
5 Pierpont was critical to the issue of the reliability of the 
6 purported confession, the lack of any real need for the officer's 
7 assistance at counsel table did not justify the resulting 
8 likelihood that the jury would be unnecessarily influenced by his 
9 continued presence alongside the State's attorneys. 
10 In trials of capital cases the court should be dogged in its 
11 protection of the accused's rights to a fair and impartial jury 
12 in order to assure "that the death penalty may not be imposed 
13 where there is substantial doubt whether it should be." State v 
14 Wood, supra. There is substantial doubt that Defendant's trial 
15 was fundamentally fair and that the jury maintained its 
16 impartiality where the State's principal witness who was twice 
17 called to the witness stand, was for five days of trial allowed 
18 to sit side by side with the State's counsel especially where 
19 reasonable alternatives were available to the State. 
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1 VII 
2 DEFENDANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR 
3 REASONS IN ADDITION TO THOSE ARGUED IN THE FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL 
4 BRIEF AND IN THE AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF. 
5 This Court has ruled that to sustain a claim of ineffective 
6 assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish l)a 
7 demonstrably deficient performance outside the wide rcinge of 
8 professionally acceptable representationf and 2)the reasonable 
9 probability that a different result would have obtained absent 
10 such deficient assistancef State v Frame, 723 P2nd 401; State v 
11 Archuleta, 747 P2nd 1019. This Court has further held that trial 
12 tactics such as choice of witnesses or choice of lines of 
13 questioning are matters usually entrusted to an attorney's best 
14 judgment and as such are not "outside the wide range of 
L5 professionally competent assistance." State v Speerf supra citing 
L6 State v Frame, supra. 
.7 
8 Amicus curiae has previously argued that defense counsel 
9 was demonstrably ineffective in his apparent failure to 
0 adequately acquaint himself with the facts relevant to the case 
1 and with certain local law, as can be demonstrated, inter alia, 
2 by his failure to request instructions for, examine the expert 
3 witness about, or argue the application of the language of 
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1 Section 76-5-202(q) which statutorily qualifies the terms 
2 "especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved 
3 manner," which omissions had an adverse impact on both the guilt 
4 and penalty phases. (As noted by amicus, the interchange between 
5 the court and counsel that appears on pages 1300 through 1304 of 
6 the record is particularly indicative of defense counsel 's 
7 failure to acquaint himself with documents filed some eight 
8 months prior to trial, specifically, and of his over-all failure 
9 to prepare, generally.) This brief supports totally the 
10 arguments of amicus curiae as regards this issue and wishes to 
11 emphasize that the inadequacies noted in that brief are not 
12 matters involving tactical decisions but products of an obviously 
13 apparent failure to prepare. 
14 In the Supplemental Brief submitted by appointed counsel it 
15 is argued that trial counsel 's representation was below 
16 acceptable objective standards of professional competence in that 
17 defense counsel failed to fully and adequately pursue the 
18 insanity defense. It should be noted that the Supplemental Brief 
19 also points to failure to prepare as the root of the ineffective 
20 assistance as regards the insanity motion. That brief correctly 
21 argued that "[a] defense attorney should not be allowed to 
22 automatically hide his failure to investigate, advise and prepare 
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1 a viable defense by simply raising the shield of trial tactic or 
2 strategy." 
3 It should also be noted that although the Supplemental Brief 
4 argues that the insanity defense should have been pursued more 
5 fully, in contrast, Defendant wishes to emphasize that he did not 
6 authorize either the insanity defense or the request for the 
7 lesser included instructions. He asserts that he had instructed 
8 his counsel to argue to the jury that he was not guilty because 
9 he did not do the act, not because he was insane or because he 
10 did the act but was guilty of some lesser offense. He feels the 
11 twp alternative arguments undermined the primary argument that 
12 should have been emphasized, solely. 
L3 ...an attorney acts as an assistant for his client 
L4 and not as a master. An attorney who refuses to present 
L5 such a basic claim as that of innocence acts outside 
.6 the duties of an attorney, even if the claim detracts 
.7 from other defenses presented by counsel. State v Wood, 
.8 supra. 
9 This brief supports the assessments of both the Amicus 
0 Curiae Brief and the Supplemental Brief that the record shows 
1 evidence that defense counsel was demonstrably unprepared for a 
2 trial of the significance of this case. Further, there appears to 
3 be a real probability of a more favorable result had trial 
1 counsel been more adequately prepared. 
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1 While trial counsel's unpreparedness affected every stage of 
2 the proceedings, it was especially damaging to the defense at the 
3 penalty stage. The only evidence presented at the penalty stage 
4 on behalf of Defendant was the written reports of the two 
5 alienists appointed by the court to evaluate Defendant pursuant 
6 the Notice of Insanity Defense. One alienist had interviewed 
7 Defendant on one occasion; the other visited with Defendant 
8 twice. The reports were read into the record by the clerk of the 
9 court (R. 1411 - 1429) who apparently stumbled on several of the 
10 words in the reports. It does not appear the alienists, 
11 themselves,,were requested or subpoenaed to appear although each 
12 was available: they were introduced to the prospective jurors on 
13 the first day of trial by the prosecutor as possible prosecution 
14 witnesses (R. 458) and they were later identified as possible 
15 prosecution witnesses after defense counsel asked for invocation 
16 of the exclusionary rule (R. 1036). 
17 This procedure used to present defense evidence at the 
18 penalty stage employed the court's clerk as the mouthpiece and 
19 consisted of written reports from two alienists who had twice 
20 before been presented to the jury as witnesses for the 
21 prosecution. The alienists, themselves, were not present to be 
22 examined or to explain or more fully develop their findings and 
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1 conclusions or to accentuate the evidence within the reports that 
2 might have benefitted Defendant or to counter the obvious 
3 impression that the reports were written by witnesses aligned 
4 with the State. No family members appeared, to make a showing of 
5 support, although Defendant's mother, brother, ex-wife, and young 
6 son were available and presumably willing to appear. No friends, 
7 former employers, or others having significant association with 
8 Defendant appeared. In fact no witnesses were called on 
9 Defendant's behalf. The record leaves this counsel (and arguably 
10 the jury) with the false impression that no person was willing to 
11 appear and stand beside Defendant and that it was therefore 
12 necessary to use State employees and witnesses to try to put on 
L3 evidence of mitigating factors. No evidence of possible influence 
L4 of alcohol was introduced despite testimony at the trial stage 
.5 that indicated that possibility (R. 1175). With reasonably 
6 competent preparation each of these problems could have been 
7 avoided. 
8 In addition to the fact that trial counsel failed to 
9 fully investigate and prepare minimally sufficient and reasonably 
0 available evidence of mitigating factors at the penalty phase, 
L counsel further failed to protect and preserve certain of 
1 Defendant's constitutionally protected rights in introducing the 
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1 evidence that was used. The alienists' reports were as damaging 
2 for what they did contain as for what they didn't. Because 
3 counsel failed to inform or prepare Defendant for the alienists' 
4 interviews, Defendant made statements - and counsel later 
5 introduced those statements - that might have been protected by 
6 the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The reports 
7 detail prior heroin and LSD use, prior commission of felonies, 
8 imprisonment, a broken marriage, a period spent as a fugitive, 
9 his response that "don't remember nothing about it" when asked 
10 about the alleged crime, and one alienist's assessment that 
11 ff[a]lthough he did not specifically deny having committed the 
12 crime throughout the examination, he persistently denies any 
13 recollection of the crime for which he is charged." The use of 
14 the reports also allowed for violations of Defendant's 6th 
15 Amendment rights to confrontation - both in that heresay from the 
16 alienists, themselves was introduced and because damaging heresay 
17 within heresay was included in the alienists' reporting of their 
18 interviews with third parties, i.e. a jailer's impression that 
19 Defendant was "cocky, arrogant, and manipulative." 
20 Although Section 76-3-207(2) allows for introduction of any 
21 relevant evidence at the penalty stage "regardless of its 
22 admissability under the exclusionary rules of evidence," this 
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1 statute does not obviate Defendant's constitutional rights and 
2 it seems unusual that defense counsel would allow introduction 
3 of the reports when much of their contents served to accentuate 
4 aggravating rather than mitigating factors. Note that the 
5 prosecutor was quick to seize upon the reports in his closing 
6 argument to point out the aggravating factors that appear in 
7 them (R. 1433-1434). The only reason to which this counsel can 
8 point to explain defense counsel 's use of the reports and his 
9 failure to introduce any other evidence is his failure to 
10 prepare. While it may be argued that this procedure was an 
11 acceptable trial tactic within the wide range of competent 
12 professional assistance, it appears probable to this counsel and 
13 consistent with the other evidence of unpreparedness that the 
L4 reports were relied on exclusively at the penalty stage 
15 principally because trial counsel had not marshalled or prepared 
.6 other available and potentially more effective evidence. One 
7 wonders what might have been presented as evidence of mitigating 
8 factors had there been no reports from the alienists. 
9 In reviewing the trial transcript it is apparent that 
0 defense counsel had significant tr^al skills but that he was 
1 demonstrably unprepared on the facts and law. It appears his 
I primary trial "tactic11 was to rely on those trial skills at the 
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1 expense of proper preparation. That tactic prejudiced defendant's 
2 rights to a fair trial and to competent legal representation. 
3 This Court should find trial counsel 's "tactic" not to be within 
4 professionally acceptable limits and that such ineffective 
5 assistance probably prevented a more favorable outcome at the 
6 penalty stage. 
7 VIII 
8 THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ERRORS OF THE TRIAL COURT, THE 
9 MISCONDUCT OF THE PROSECUTOR, AND THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
10 DEFENSE COUNSEL DENIED DEFENDANT A FAIR OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT 
11 HIS DEFENCE. 
12 ... the Defendant is ... entitled to 
13 have [the errors] considered cumulatively and 
14 as a part of the over-all picture in 
15 determining whether he had a fair opportunity 
16 to present his defense. State v St.Clair, 
17 supra; also see Gooden v Oklahoma, 617 P2nd 
18 248. 
19 As has been noted, the trial court committed several 
20 errors, each of which, standing on its own, substantially 
21 affected Defendant's ability to present a viable defense; the 
22 prosecutor made several improper comments in closing argument, 
23 each of which raise reasonable doubt as to whether the jury was 
24 able to maintain its neutrality and impartiality; and, probably 
25 most critical, the record indicates that defense counsel failed 
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1 to adequately prepare for trial and was therefore unable to 
2 protect Defendant's substantial rights at several junctures of 
3 the trial. 
4 A listing of those errors and omissions includes: the trial 
5 court's denial of the motion for change of venue, its admission 
6 of prejudicial and inflammatory photographs, its admission of 
7 Defendant's purported statement where substantial evidence 
8 existed indicating that it was not voluntarily given and where it 
9 was not in the words of Defendant, its instruction allowing the 
10 jury to consider any evidence presented at the guilt stage in its 
11 deliberation in the penalty stage, its failure to instruct the 
12 jury at both the guilt and penalty stage regarding the limiting 
13 language of Section 76-5-202(q), its failure to exclude officer 
L4 Pierpont from the proceedings, and its failure to give 
15 contemporaneous admonishments to the jury to disregard the 
.6 prosecutor's various improper comments during closing argument; 
7 the prosecutor's improper comments during closing argument 
8 including misleading references as to the meaning of aggravating 
9 circumstances, a comment on Defendant's failure to testify, 
0 vouching for a State's witness, and several misstatement of 
1 facts; defense counsel's failure to discover, failure to avail 
2 himself of the prosecutor's "open file" policy, failure to 
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1 educate himself as to local law, failure to adequately support 
2 the motions for change of venue and the defense of insanity, and 
3 failure to adequately present minimal evidence of mitigating 
4 factors at the penalty stage. 
5 In addition to the individual effect of each of the various 
6 errors and omissions, their cumulative effect prejudiced 
7 Defendant's right to a fundamentally fair trial by an impartial 
8 jury. 
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1 CONCLUSIONS 
2 Defendant's conviction should be vacated and the matter 
3 remanded for new trial for the reasons that the various errors of 
4 the trial court, improper comments of the prosecutor, and most 
5 notably, the failure of defense counsel to prepare an adequate 
6 defense or object to the court's errors or the prosecutor's 
7 misconduct undermine a reasonable confidence in the fundamental 
8 fairness of the trail at both the guilt/innocence and sentence 
9 stages. 
10 Dated this 6th day of May, 1988. 
11 Respectfully submitted by: 
L2 
13 
L4 Thomas H. Me&ns 
.5 Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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